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Abstract In light of the variety of uses of the term autonomy in recent bioethics
literature, in this paper, I suggest that competence, not being as contested, is better
placed to play the anti-paternalistic role currently assigned to autonomy. The
demonstration of competence, I will argue, can provide individuals with robust
spheres of non-interference in which they can pursue their lives in accordance with
their own values. This protection from paternalism is achieved by granting indi-
viduals rights to non-interference upon demonstration of competence. In this paper,
I present a risk-sensitive account of competence as a means of grounding rights to
non-interference. On a risk-sensitive account of competence individuals demon-
strate their competence by exercising three capacities to the extent necessary to
meet a threshold determined by the riskiness of the decision. These three capacities
are the capacity to (i) acquire knowledge, (ii) use instrumental rationality, and (iii)
form and revise a life plan.
Keywords Autonomy  Paternalism  Competence  Liberalism  Non-interference
Introduction
In this paper, I argue that, in light of the mismatch between the competing
interpretations of autonomy in the wider philosophical literature and the interpre-
tation given to the term autonomy in a liberal bioethics (which encompasses only
some of the uses in the wider literature), we should consider moving towards talk of
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‘‘competence’’ rather than ‘‘autonomy’’ when allocating decision-making authority
to people in the clinical context. In a liberal bioethics, the value of autonomy is
taken to require that medical practitioners be sensitive to the individual’s values and
desires regarding healthcare interventions. Autonomy, hence, plays an anti-
paternalistic role by allowing individuals to live their own lives in accordance
with their own values. In the wider philosophical literature on autonomy, however,
it encompasses much more than that. Autonomy, for example, is normally taken
also to require the lack of coercion, deception or manipulation (Noggle 2005, 87).
Some authors take the fact that autonomy is incompatible with coercion, deception
and manipulation to imply that autonomy requires independence of some sort
(Dworkin 1988). Autonomy is also often taken to require authenticity; that is, that
an individual’s values be their own in some sense (Hyun 2001; Noggle 2005;
Watson 1975). Moreover, autonomy is also closely linked to rationality and
knowledge, as ignorance, (Savulescu 2007; Savulescu and Momeyer 1997) and
certain forms of irrationality (delusions for example) are often taken to undermine
autonomy.
In light of this variety of uses, in this paper, I suggest that competence, not
being as contested, is better placed to play the anti-paternalistic role currently
assigned to autonomy. The demonstration of competence, I will argue, can
provide individuals with robust spheres of non-interference in which they can
pursue their lives in accordance with their own values. This protection from
paternalism is achieved by granting individuals rights to non-interference upon the
demonstration of competence. In this paper, I present a risk-sensitive account of
competence as a means of grounding rights to non-interference (Brock 1991;
Buchanan and Brock 1986). On a risk-sensitive account of competence an
individual demonstrates their competence by exercising three capacities to the
extent necessary to meet a threshold determined by the riskiness of the decision.
These three capacities are the capacity to (i) acquire knowledge, (ii) use
instrumental rationality, and (iii) form and revise a life plan.
Before turning to arguing for replacing talk of autonomy with a risk-sensitive
account of competence, it will be useful to outline the structure of the argument that
follows. In order to ground the problem, in the following section, I will briefly
discuss some of the panoply of meanings currently attributed to autonomy and argue
that many of these fail to explain or justify the primary role of autonomy in a liberal
bioethics. Secondly, I argue that, in clinical ethics, autonomy primarily plays an
anti-paternalistic role by protecting people’s ability to live their own lives in
accordance with their own values. In the section entitled ‘‘Competence and
Decisional Authority’’, I develop an account of competence which grounds robust
rights to non-interference in order to show that competence can play the anti-
paternalistic role currently attributed to autonomy. By grounding rights to non-
interference, the demonstration of competence provides people with space in which
to organise their own lives in accordance with their own values. With this account of
rights against non-interference in hand, in the section entitled ‘‘Risk-Sensitive
Competence’’, I take up the task of establishing how competence determinations
should be made, arguing for a risk-sensitive account of competence which yields
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competence determinations which are compatible with the requirements respect for
autonomy is normally taken to impose.
Autonomy and Its Role in a Liberal Bioethics
In this section, I aim to show two things: firstly, that the term ‘‘autonomy’’ is used in
a number of ways in the literature and, secondly, that autonomy’s core role in a
liberal bioethics is the protection of people’s ability to live their lives in accordance
with their own values. This section, hence, lays the foundation for the argument of
the rest of the paper: that competence is better suited to play the anti-paternalistic
role currently assigned to autonomy. If talk of autonomy in the philosophical
literature in general can be shown to be wider than the role it should play in a liberal
bioethics, we have reason to re-focus the discussion surrounding the core problem
autonomy is used to address: when should people be entitled to make their own
decisions regarding their own healthcare in light of their own values.
Autonomy (like other concepts like ‘‘democracy’’, ‘‘justice’’ and ‘‘art’’) is
conceptualised differently by different authors.1 In the introduction, I suggested that
autonomy was connected to rationality (Taylor 2009, 3; Savulescu 2007; Savulescu
and Momeyer 1997), responsiveness to reasons, independence (Dworkin 1988),
authenticity (Hyun 2001; Noggle 2005; Watson 1975), and the absence of coercion,
deception and manipulation. Some authors argue that autonomy is inherently
historical (Christman 1991) while others who hold structural accounts deny this,
making autonomy depend on whether an individual’s preferences are ‘‘integrated’’
(Ekstrom 2005) or whether they are hierarchically ordered in the appropriate way
(Dworkin 1988).
Anyone who delves into the philosophical literature surrounding autonomy
quickly realises that there is no univocal understanding of autonomy to be found
(Vargas 2006). Rather, ‘‘we find people disagreeing about the proper use of the
concepts […] when we examine the different uses of these terms and the
characteristic arguments in which they figure we soon see that there is no one
clearly definable general use of any of them which can be set up as the correct or
standard use’’ (Gallie 1956, 168). This, however, should not be taken to imply that
discussions concerning autonomy are being conducted at cross purposes. Discus-
sions of autonomy have, along with the lack of a single unified and standard use,
another feature which distinguishes these forms of disagreement from disagree-
ments over concepts which are radically confused. Even though different theorists
have different competing interpretations of autonomy ‘‘a certain piece of evidence
or argument put forward by one side in an apparently endless dispute can be
recognized to have a definite logical force, even by those whom it entirely fails to
convince’’ (Gallie 1956, 190).
1 Authors such as Vargas (2006), Arpaly (2003), Dworkin (1988) and Rainer Forst (2005) propose
extensive taxonomies of different types of autonomy as a means of illustrating how varied the
conceptions of autonomy are. These extensive taxonomies of different uses, however, are disputed by
other authors. Taylor (2009), for example, has argued that Arpaly’s (2003) taxonomy in particular is
based on a systematic misunderstanding of the nature of autonomy.
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In this intellectual climate, different accounts of autonomy, although they all
attempt to capture some of the connotations that autonomy is taken to have,
invariably end up being partially stipulative (Taylor 2009, 1–2; Double 1992),
capturing most, but not all, of the elements of autonomy. In as far as these accounts
fail to capture elements which are, for other theorists, central to autonomy, disputes
arise not only about which conception of autonomy is better on its own terms, but
also disputes about what the criteria of the ‘‘best account of autonomy’’ should be.
Even though some of these revisionary accounts of autonomy can be quite
successful they will inevitably fail to capture some of the elements commonly
associated with autonomy. When discussing autonomy with other theorists who do
not share the same set of intuitions and presuppositions about what autonomy is and
why it matters, disagreements do not only centre on whether a particular account
captures most of the connotations of the concept of autonomy but also whether these
connotations are worth capturing (Gallie 1956, 171). Deeper disagreements appear
when the term ‘‘autonomy’’ isn’t taken to be synonymous with ‘‘personal
autonomy’’. Once Kantian interpretations are incorporated, the possibility of
extensionally correct elucidations of the term appears even more remote.
Although some of the elements that competing interpretations of autonomy
attempt to capture are relevant to debates in bioethics and political philosophy,
many often fail to adequately describe and justify the role autonomy currently plays
in bioethical debate (Arpaly 2005). In as far as autonomy requires integrated
preferences, independence and authenticity, these conceptions of autonomy ascribe
autonomy to a relatively small subset of people. Importantly, this subset of people
will be smaller than the group of people we (pre-theoretically) believe should be
entitled to make their own decisions regarding their own healthcare in light of their
own values and life plans. The problem with having divergent and mutually
incompatible accounts of autonomy, hence, is that as a result of the theoretical
discussions about which conception of autonomy is preferable they end up imposing
requirements which conflict with what I take to be the primary role of autonomy
within a liberal bioethics: the protection of people’s ability to live their own lives in
accordance with their own values. As these competing interpretations are developed
partly in response to theoretical debates which go beyond the protection of an
individual’s ability to live a life plan and are, hence, much richer concepts; their
inability to correctly identify the set of people who should be entitled to make their
own decisions is to be expected.
Having outlined the structure of the problem, it is now time to turn to justifying
its major premise: the role of autonomy in bioethics is protecting people’s ability to
live their own lives in accordance with their own values. Increased usage of the term
‘‘autonomy’’ over the last 50 years within bioethics is partly a response to increased
pluralism. Unlike in more homogenous societies, the citizens of pluralistic societies
hold many diverse views about the good life which can, on occasion, violently
conflict with the conception of the good held by other citizens of their polity. The
term ‘‘autonomy’’ has come to play an anti-paternalistic role within bioethics as its
value was appealed to as a means of justifying allocating decision-making authority
over medical interventions to the person undergoing them. In virtue of the function
autonomy has played in bioethical debates over the last half a century, usage within
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bioethics has distanced itself from the wider debates surrounding the meaning and
value of autonomy, focusing in on the problem of who should decide what should
happen to people in clinical contexts.
Increased pluralism, hence, has led to talk of autonomy being primarily about
allocating decision-making authority to allow individuals with values different to
the mainstream to live their lives in light of them. Debates about who should get to
have decision-making authority over their healthcare in clinical bioethics do not
focus on ascertaining whether or not individuals were brainwashed early in life, how
their wills are structured or whether their autonomy is undermined in virtue of them
having internalised beliefs which preclude them from choosing certain ends.
Respect for autonomy in current liberal bioethics requires merely that we allow
‘‘adult, competent patients to base their decisions on whatever values they choose to
structure their lives’’ (May 2005, 302) and that we ‘‘recognize with due appreciation
that person’s capacities and perspective, include the right to control his or her
affairs, to make certain choices, and to take certain actions based on personal values
or beliefs’’ (Beauchamp 2005, 311). In conclusion, in a liberal bioethics, autonomy
plays an important anti-paternalistic role by demarcating the actions ‘‘a patient has
the right to perform without paternalistic intervention, actions that are ‘one’s own
business’’’ (Arpaly 2005, 174).
In this section, I have argued that the primary function talk of autonomy plays in
liberal bioethics (i.e., the protection of people’s abilities to live out their own lives
in accordance with their own values) cannot be adequately explained and justified
by the multiple, competing accounts of autonomy we find in the wider philosophical
literature. This is due to the fact these conceptions of autonomy attribute the
property to fewer people than those we (pre-theoretically) believe should be entitled
to make their own decisions regarding healthcare. This lack of extensional
correctness, I suggested, is due to the fact that conceptions of autonomy are
constructed as a response to theoretical disputes which extend beyond the questions
concerning who should be entitled to make their own decisions in pluralistic
societies.
Competence and Decisional Authority
Having argued that talk of autonomy fails to capture what I take to be the primary
role of autonomy, it is time to turn to the second part of the argument: that
competence is better suited to play the anti-paternalistic role currently assigned to
autonomy. This argument will occur over the next two sections. In this section, I
will argue that competence determinations which distribute decisional authority can
protect an individual’s ability to live their own lives in accordance with their own
values by grounding rights to non-interference. These rights to non-interference
protect an individual’s ability to pursue their own conception of the good by
providing them with a protected sphere of action in which they can pursue their
projects without these being thwarted by others. Having shown that competence
determinations which distribute decisional authority have to distribute rights to non-
interference to protect people’s ability to live their own lives, in the section
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entitled ‘‘Risk-Sensitive Competence’’, I take up the question of how we should
assess competence. This second question is vital for the plausibility of the account
being presented as depending on how competence is assessed, different sets of
people will possess rights to non-interference. In light of the importance of these
rights, the plausibility of substituting talk of autonomy with an account of
competence depends heavily on who is deemed to be entitled to rights to non-
interference. Having outlined how the positive argument is divided over the coming
two sections, let us turn to arguing that the distribution of decisional authority
protects an individual’s ability to live their own lives in accordance with their own
values by grounding rights to non-interference.
The literature on competence widely agrees that the purpose of competence
assessments is to ascertain who should have decisional authority over a particular
choice (Kim 2006, 93; Richardson 2010, 62; Welie 2001, 139; Baumgarten 1980,
180; Buller 2001, 93; Annas and Densberger 1984, 561; Brock 1991; Skene 1991).
Faden et al., for example, state that a judgement that one is competent ‘‘commonly
functions to denote persons whose consents, refusals and statements of preference
will be accepted as binding’’ (1986, 290). It is the purpose of this section to argue
that possessing decisional authority is important as it enables those who possess it to
live their own lives in accordance with their own values by making the person’s
consent necessary before proceeding to act in certain ways. In as far as it is
impermissible to go against the wishes and desires of competent people, a
demonstration of competence entitles individuals to pursue their own plans in
accordance with their own values by giving them power over what will happen to
them. In other words, they grant individuals rights to non-interference.
In order to protect a person’s ability to live their own lives in accordance with
their own values we must abstain from interfering with the choices individuals make
as these are the means through which a person’s life plans are put into action. This is
due to the fact that, in their absence, attempts to put complex plans into action could
be thwarted by others (e.g., doctors, family members…) thereby reducing the extent
to which people can live their lives in accordance with their own values. In order to
give some definite content to the idea that the ability to live one’s life in accordance
with one’s own values requires rights to non-interference, it is first necessary to see
what rights to non-interference preclude others from doing (i.e., we need to know
the scope of the right to non-interference). Establishing the scope of rights to non-
interference is partly a tightrope act. If the rights are too robust, they will preclude
interference with people’s choices in cases where we believe it permissible to
interfere. If, on the other hand, the rights are too weak, the individual’s ability to
live their own life will be too restricted. Keeping these two potential pitfalls in
mind, it is time to answer the question: What constitutes interference?
In this paper, I will consider three types of interference with a person’s actions:
Checking Interference (CI), Temporary Blocking Interference (TBI) and Permanent
Blocking Interference (PBI). Let us call CI that aimed at ascertaining whether the
individual is competent and Blocking Interference that aimed at precluding the
individual from carrying out their proposed plan of action. Blocking Interference
can be both Temporary (TBI) or Permanent (PBI). PBI occurs when an individual
blocks another individual from pursuing their proposed plan of action indefinitely.
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TBI involves the delaying of the action for a definite and finite period of time. With
this terminology in hand, let us consider a series of cases in order to see which forms
of interference our rights to non-interference should protects us from.
Voluntary Amputation Barry contacts his local surgeon to schedule a voluntary
amputation of his leg. When the surgeon meets Barry, she tells him they won’t be
performing the operation that day (TBI) as she first needs to establish that Barry is
competent (CI). Barry, following a series of interviews with different medical
practitioners, is deemed incompetent by the clinical team. In virtue of his
incompetence, the clinical team make a recommendation on his medical history
that he not be allowed to seek voluntary amputation from any other surgeon
(PBI).
Wannabe Maude has long wanted a surgical amputation of her leg and, hence,
arranges an appointment with a surgeon. When the surgeon meets Maude, she
tells her they won’t be performing the operation that day (TBI) as she first needs
to establish that Maude is competent (CI). Maude is subjected to a series of
interviews with different medical practitioners in which she explains why she
believes she will be more comfortable having only one leg, why she believes
surgery is for her, and that she is aware of both the potential negative health
consequences and the likely inconveniences that she would inflict upon herself.
Following these interviews, Maude is deemed competent by her clinical team. In
virtue of her competence, the clinical team go ahead and arrange for a safe
amputation.2
In Voluntary Amputation and Wannabe, both Maude and Barry are subjected to
CI and TBI. TBI is often necessary in order for medical practitioners (and other
bystanders in non-clinical contexts) to have the time to undertake CI. The difference
between the cases was that Maude, following CI, was allowed to pursue her
preferred course of action whereas Barry was not. This is because, in the examples,
Barry is not competent, whereas Maude is. This is, I believe, intuitively correct.
Whereas it is permissible to preclude Barry from amputating his leg, it is not
permissible to preclude competent patients like Maude from doing so. This intuition
lends support to the idea that a determination of competence should distribute
decisional authority. Maude, as she is competent, should have the decisional
authority to pursue her preferred course of action. Engaging in PBI with regards to
his choice to seek a voluntary amputation would be impermissible as it would
undermine his decisional authority. Maude should, hence, have a Right to
Permanent Blocking Non-Interference (RPBI). Barry, in virtue of his incompetence,
does not have a right against PBI. The RPBI, however, is not enough to adequately
protect an individual’s decision-making authority. If Maude only acquired a right
against PBI, it would be permissible to continue to engage in CI and TBI every time
she wished to pursue courses of action which she has demonstrated her competence
to perform. This is no small problem. Continuing to delay Maude’s plan of action
2 This case is not dissimilar from the case of Robert Smith, who performed a healthy limb amputation for
a patient in 1997 (Bayne and Levy 2005, 75). For further discussion of the ethics of voluntary amputation
see: Patrone (2009), Bridy (2004), Song (2013), Ryan (2009), Schramme (2008), White (2014).
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through CI and TBI would interfere massively with her ability to live her own life in
accordance with her own values. CI and TBI are instances of interference we should
be protected from because we care when a project gets completed, not just that it
does. In as far as our life plans involve coordinating action across time, forms of
interference which delay the completion of parts of our plan interfere with our
ability to live our own lives. If the role of competence is to protect our ability to live
our own lives, the demonstration of competence should protect us from all three
forms of interference: CI, TBI and PBI. In other words, the demonstration of
competence grounds a Complete Right to Non-Interference (RCI ? RT-
BI ? RPBI). This right is a cluster right (Thomson 1990, 55) composed of three
separate rights: the right to checking non-interference (RCI) and the rights to both
temporary (RTBI) and permanent blocking non-interference (RPBI).
When an individual possesses a Complete Right to Non-Interference
(RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI), they possess decisional authority over their choices, which
makes them ‘‘persons whose consents, refusals and statements of preference will be
accepted as binding’’ (Faden et al. 1986, 290). The demonstration of competence, by
grounding rights to non-interference, grants individuals a sphere in which to pursue
their own lives in accordance with their own values and, hence, is able to play the
anti-paternalistic role commonly attributed to autonomy. Having argued that the
demonstration of competence grounds Complete Rights to Non-Interference
(RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI) as a means to protecting an individual’s ability to live
their own lives, it is time to turn to answering the most important question: How do
individuals demonstrate competence? This question is crucial as the answer to it
determines which individuals are entitled to Complete Rights to Non-Interference
(RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI) and, by extension, who is protected in the pursuit of their
own lives in accordance with their own values.
Risk-Sensitive Competence
In the preceding section, I argued that in order for competence determinations to
distribute decisional authority in such a way as to protect an individual’s ability to
live their own lives in accordance with their own values, they must ground
Complete Rights to Non-Interference (RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI). In virtue of the role
competence assessments play, whether or not an individual is deemed competent
has substantial normative implications. As was seen in Voluntary Amputation,
failing to demonstrate one’s competence can lead to PBI and more CI which, I
argued above, substantially impair an individual’s ability to live their own lives. In
virtue of the contribution a demonstration of competence makes to people’s ability
to pursue their own life plans, it is vital to provide an account of how an individual
demonstrates competence in order to see whether or not the account of competence
presented can take on autonomy’s anti-paternalistic role. If the account of
competence fails to distribute decisional authority to all those who we (pre-
theoretically) believe should be entitled to make their own healthcare decisions, it
will fail as a substitute for talk of autonomy which, in virtue of its wider theoretical
baggage, leads to extensionally incorrect distributions of decisional authority.
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In this section, I argue for a risk-sensitive account of competence as a criteria for
distributing decisional authority. On a risk sensitive account of competence an
individual demonstrates their competence by exercising their agential capacities to
the extent necessary to meet a threshold determined by the riskiness of the decision.
The three capacities the individual must exercise are: (i) the capacity to acquire
knowledge, (ii) the capacity for instrumental rationality, and (iii) the capacity to
form and revise a life plan.
Before turning to specifying how risk influences the threshold of capacity an
individual has to meet to demonstrate competence I will, firstly, explain why the
exercise of capacities (i) through (iii) is necessary and sufficient for an individual to
be considered competent to consent.
Knowledge, Rationality and a Life Plan
In order for individuals to be competent to pursue a course of action, they must
possess the ability to acquire and understand factual knowledge about the world.
This, in turn, will require: the capacity to perceive the world in a way which allows
for new evidence to become salient (Savulescu and Momeyer 1997), memory, the
capacity to represent the world in the form of beliefs and, finally, the ability to
contrast beliefs with reality to ascertain whether they are true.
The capacity to perceive the world in some way is a sensible component of the
capacity to acquire knowledge as, without it, the only knowledge we would have
access to would be either a priori, or the result of introspection. In order for an
individual to be deemed competent to make the types of choices involved in clinical
care they require knowledge of the world, not just a priori knowledge. Memory is
also important for competence in virtue of the fact that medical decisions extend
over time. Without the capacity to retain the information required, we would be
unable to put our life plans into effect. With regard to the capacity to form beliefs
and contrast them to the world, these are required due to the fact knowledge consists
of, at least, justified true belief (Gettier 1963). Without the capacity to represent the
sense data we receive and the inferences we draw from it as beliefs, we would be
unable to meet one of the necessary conditions of knowledge: the possession of
beliefs about the world. In order to acquire knowledge, we must also possess the
ability to contrast these beliefs with reality in order to be justified in believing them
(using our sensory capacities, memory and reason). In as far as justification has
something to do with a relationship between the belief and the world, the ability to
contrast beliefs to the world is necessary for the capacity to acquire knowledge.
Exactly which mental faculties are involved in producing reliable methods of
contrasting beliefs to the world (i.e., the question of when we are justified in
believing propositions) is a question which goes beyond the concern of this paper.
The reader is, hence, invited to use their favoured theory of justification to answer
these questions. Whilst the capacity to acquire factual knowledge seems necessary
for an individual to be deemed competent, it is not sufficient. Without the capacities
for instrumental rationality and the capacity to form and revise a life plan, we lack a
set of ends to pursue and the ability to choose means in light of them. Unless an
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individual can demonstrate the exercise of these two further capacities, they cannot
acquire Complete Rights to Non-Interference (RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI).
Let us now turn to the second capacity, the capacity for instrumental rationality.
This capacity, like the capacity to acquire knowledge, is necessary for an individual
to be deemed competent. Without the ability to use the information acquired in
decision-making to pursue one’s ends, the capacity for knowledge does not give us
the means necessary for us to be able to live our own lives in accordance with our
own values. Instrumental rationality involves the ability to compare the represen-
tations we make of courses of action in light of our ends (Berg et al. 1996;
Appelbaum 2007). The capacity for instrumental rationality, hence, requires the
ability to join factual information with questions of value in order to arrive at
conclusions about what we have reason to do. As the demonstration of competence
grounds Complete Rights to Non-Interference (RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI) as a means
of providing us with the space to pursue our life plans, in order to be deemed
competent an individual must be able to exercise the capacity to reason
instrumentally. If the capacity for instrumental rationality is not taken as an
element of competence, there would not be a connection between the rights
demonstrating competence grounds and the ability to pursue one’s life plan that the
rights protect. The exercise of the capacity for instrumental rationality is, along with
the capacity to acquire factual knowledge, necessary for an individual to be deemed
competent and, hence, acquire Complete Rights to Non-Interference (RCI ? RT-
BI ? RPBI). These two capacities, whilst both necessary, are not jointly sufficient.
The third capacity which constitutes competence is the capacity to form and
revise a life plan. Without a life plan to provide the ends, instrumental rationality
and the capacity to acquire knowledge would be unable to provide guidance
regarding which course of action to take. Without a life plan, people would be
unable to evaluate states of the world and (using their instrumental rationality and
knowledge) choose in light of these evaluations. By organising our diverse values
into more of less coherent wholes (Fried 1970, 19), life plans provide us with the
evaluative framework necessary to rank alternative courses of action, which is a
precondition to choosing in such a way as to pursue our conceptions of the good.
The values life plans organise are diverse in a number of ways. Values vary in their
generality (Raz 1986, 293) and in their fundamentalness (Noggle 1997, 318).
General values permeate more aspects of our lives than their more specific
counterparts. Honesty, for example, could (and arguably should) influence our
decisions in all areas of our life, whilst chastity may only affect our sex lives (and/or
religious lives if our particular religion proscribes certain sexual practices, such as
sex outside marriage). Fundamental values come closer to the core of who we are
than superficial values and are those we are less inclined to give up. Further along
the scale of fundamental-ness are ‘‘grounding projects’’. Our ‘‘grounding projects’’
are those values which are so fundamental there may be no reason to carry on living
in their absence (Williams 1976, 209).
The diversity of values requires a system for ranking these and determining ‘‘the
magnitudes of risk which he will accept for his various ends at various times in his
life’’ (Fried 1970, 95; Childress 1982, 191). Life plans, hence, govern the trade-offs
between goods which cannot be pursued in parallel (Dworkin 2006, 109). When
244 HEC Forum (2018) 30:235–252
123
faced with a choice which requires a trade-off, having an organised system of values
enables us to consider how factual information that informs choices is relevant to
our lives by asking, for example, whether a particular sacrifice of one value is
warranted in virtue of its contribution to furthering another and whether the choice
violates one’s ‘‘ground projects’’.
The principles which rank alternatives and stipulate how much risk to one goal
we are willing to accept for another are often hard to express propositionally (Raz
1986, 294) and, for that reason, often remain implicit or inchoate (Fried 1970, 30).
In as far as these principles remain inchoate they are vulnerable to two types of
problem: incompleteness and inconsistency. Situations may present themselves
which call for a ranking of values or states of affairs which we have never
considered or even for the valuing of something which we had not considered
valuing before. These tensions provide us with opportunities to extend our partially
inchoate life plan, making it more comprehensive. Novel situations can also provide
evidence of inconsistency in one’s life plan. When our partially complete ordering
of values and ends appears to recommend two incompatible courses of action, we
need to modify our life plans to reduce this inconsistency. These two problems
generated by the inchoate nature of our life plans make the capacity to revise, as
well as to form, life plans crucial to whether an individual is competent.
Competence, hence, is determined by the extent to which an individual exercises
three capacities: (i) the capacity to acquire knowledge, (ii) the capacity for
instrumental rationality, and (iii) the capacity to form and revise a life plan. These
three capacities, I have argued, are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a
person to be competent. Whether or not an individual is competent, I stated above,
was a matter of whether or not the individual could meet a threshold. The use of
thresholds is necessary for scalar properties to yield binary determinations. As the
exercise of the three capacities which constitute competence is a matter of degree; in
order for a demonstration of competence to distribute decisional authority in a
binary fashion, we need to set a threshold which, once met, would entitle the
individual to Complete Rights to Non-Interference (RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI). In
virtue of the significance of meeting the threshold that grounds RCI ? RT-
BI ? RPBI, the open question at this point is: How do we set the threshold?
Risk and Thresholds
In this section, I will argue for a risk-sensitive approach to competence (Cale 1999;
Brock 1991; Skene 1991) as a means of setting the threshold of the three capacities
which constitute competence which the individual must meet to ground their
Complete Rights to Non-Interference (RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI). The basic claim of a
risk-sensitive approach to competence is the following: the riskier the decision, the
greater the extent to which an individual must demonstrate the exercise of the
capacities which jointly constitute competence in order to acquire a Complete Right
to Non-Interference (RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI). On this account, it is easier to
demonstrate competence for non-risky courses of action than it is for risky ones. As
the demonstration of competence determines whether we possess a Complete Right
to Non-Interference, it will be harder to pursue risky courses of action without being
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interfered with than it will be to pursue non-risky ones. In light of the vital role
Complete Rights to Non-Interference play in enabling us to pursue our plans, any
measure which makes it harder for people to acquire them stands in need of
justification. The question of how the riskiness of a decision is determined is, hence,
central to the plausibility of the account presented. If we determine risk in the wrong
way, we may end up denying Complete Rights to Non-Interference to individuals
who should, intuitively, be entitled to live their own lives in accordance with their
own values.
In this section, I will argue that the extent to which a proposed activity is risky for
an individual should be determined using the individual’s own values (Buchanan
and Brock 1986). On a subjective account of risk, the riskiness of a decision is
determined by assessing the probability of an outcome happening versus the
magnitude of the harm. The magnitude of the harm is to be determined by the extent
to which the outcome would negatively impact a person’s life plans and their ability
to pursue them. This is, I believe, required if competence is to play the anti-
paternalist role currently attributed to autonomy. The role of autonomy in a liberal
bioethics, I argued above, is to protect an individual’s ability to live their own lives
in accordance with their own values. As individual’s life plans contain ranking
principles which mark out some goods as being more important than others (Fried
1970, 19; Raz 1986, 292) and set the magnitude of risk to one goal one would be
willing to take in order to complete another (Fried 1970, 95, 177; Childress 1982,
191), respecting an individual’s ability to pursue their own life requires setting the
threshold of competence according to the individual’s own values. If, instead of
using a subjective approach to risk, we used an objective determination of risk
(medical best interests, for example), we would fail to respect an individual’s ability
to live their life plans in accordance with their own values. As the riskiness of the
decision sets the threshold the individual must meet to acquire Complete Rights to
Non-Interference (RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI), using an objective criterion of risk could
lead to situations in which individuals are found to be incompetent (with its
corresponding loss of decision-making authority) on the basis of the threshold being
raised in response to a factor the individual does not consider to be risky. This, I
believe, fails to respect an individual’s ability to live their lives in accordance with
their values.
With a sketch of the theory in hand, let us return to some modified versions of the
cases involving voluntary amputation presented above to see whether the account
presented here is plausible.
Magician A magician consults his surgeon and asks for them to amputate his
hand, stating he no longer wants it to be a part of him. Presented with such an
unusual request, the surgeon refers the patient to a psychiatrist who interviews the
magician to determine whether he is competent (CI ? TBI). In order to do so, the
psychiatrist first inquires into the magician’s values and plans. The psychiatrist
discovers the magician often does card tricks during his performances and,
although currently pursuing an alternative career as a barista, still has dreams of
becoming a full time magician. During the course of the interview, it becomes
apparent the magician is uncomfortable accepting help from others, even with
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tasks he struggles with, such as filling out his taxes. This behaviour coheres with
his expressed desires to be independent and not the object of charity. It is deemed
by the clinical team that, in light of a hand amputation being hard to make
compatible with the magician’s values and desires, the procedure is risky for the
magician. A suitably high threshold of competence is then established. Having
decided to go ahead anyway, the magician’s competence is assessed. Upon failing
to meet the high threshold, the individual is deemed incompetent and the
operation fails to go ahead.
Leg Amputation Sandra has long wanted a surgical amputation of her leg and,
hence, arranges an appointment with a surgeon. Presented with such an unusual
request, the surgeon refers the patient to a psychiatrist who interviews Sandra to
determine whether she is competent (CI ? TBI). In order to do so, the
psychiatrist first inquires into Sandra’s values and discovers she has long been a
wannabe (i.e., an individual who desires a voluntary amputation). Furthermore,
she has experimented for periods of time with restricting the movement of her
leg, using crutches and wheelchairs to move around the house. Although the
pursuit of other activities she values is made more cumbersome with the walking
aids, she is willing to pay these costs for satisfying her persistent desire for a
voluntary below the knee amputation if a prosthesis could not be fitted. Following
this interview, the voluntary amputation of Sandra’s leg is not deemed
particularly risky to Sandra and a suitably low threshold (which the magician
could have met) is established. Deciding to go ahead with the amputation,
Sandra’s competence is assessed, she is deemed competent and the surgeon
proceeds with the amputation.
An important implication of the account being presented here is the fact that a
risk-sensitive account of competence entitles people to pursue actions which are
compatible with their life plans relatively free from interference. Actions which are
not compatible with the individual’s life plan are, on a risk-sensitive account,
correspondingly hard to pursue. In Magician, the protagonist was deemed
incompetent to pursue his plan in virtue of the fact that the procedure was risky
for him. Whereas in Leg Amputation, Sandra was entitled to pursue her proposed
plan of action by meeting a low threshold, the magician was precluded from
engaging in qualitatively similar actions on the basis of his inability to meet a high
threshold. It seems, then, that the magician’s failure to acquire Complete Rights to
Non-Interference is caused by the fact competence has been taken to be risk-
sensitive. It could be objected that, under an alternative account of competence
which didn’t make reference to the riskiness of the decision, the magician would
have been entitled to pursue his amputation free from interference by others. This
objection can be interpreted as a demand for justification for raising the threshold.
Why, then, is it the case that Sandra should have decision-making authority to
pursue her voluntary amputation whereas the magician should not?
The reason Sandra should be entitled to have a voluntary amputation is due to the
fact that this option is an important element of her life plan. Not allowing the
individual to pursue these choices would unjustifiably limit her ability to live her
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life in accordance with her own values. The importance of allowing individuals to
live their own lives does not disappear when the choices they make appear to be
harmful or strange. Complete Rights to Non-Interference (RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI)
protect an individual’s ability to live their lives regardless of what others perceive to
be the ‘‘correct’’ choice. The right to non-interference grants the individual a sphere
of jurisdiction in which ‘‘we let that person go his own way, whether we approve of
it or not’’ (Neumman 2000, 294). This, I believe, is in keeping with the role
autonomy should play in a liberal bioethics. The respect we have for autonomy in
clinical encounters is not a form of appraisal respect, but of recognition respect.
Appraisal respect, unlike recognition respect, is a response to excellence (Hill 2000)
and, hence, requires pro-attitudes towards the object of respect. Recognition respect,
on the other hand, is a matter of giving the object of respect appropriate weight in
one’s deliberations and acting accordingly (Darwall 1977; Dillon 2016). In order to
give people’s capacities appropriate weight, we must not preclude them from
pursuing their projects. Importantly, this requirement holds independently of what
we think of the content of the individual’s life plan. If competence is to take the role
of autonomy in a liberal bioethics, it too must ground rights independently of
whether or not others approve of the life plan they will be used to pursue. Having
shown that Sandra should be entitled to pursue her life plan, let us now turn to see
why it is appropriate to not give Complete Rights to Non-Interference
(RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI) to the magician.
Not giving complete rights to non-interference to the magician is justified in
virtue of the fact that raising the threshold of competence in the way required by the
risk-sensitive standard does not preclude the magician from living out his own life
in accordance with his own values. In as far as the threshold has been raised using
the individual’s own values, not granting the individual Complete Rights to Non-
Interference (RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI) if he decides to act against his expressed
values is, if anything, more akin to requiring him to live in accordance with his
values rather than prohibiting him from living his life in accordance with them.
Raising the threshold in this way, hence, is compatible with the role autonomy
should play in a liberal bio-ethics, i.e., protecting people’s abilities to live their own
lives in accordance with their own values.
It could be objected, however, that requiring people live their lives in accordance
with their own values is also problematic in virtue of the fact it limits the extent to
which an individual is free to choose which course of action to pursue. In light of the
common association between respect for autonomy and allowing individuals to
choose which course of action they want to take (Taylor 2009, 83), requiring an
individual live their own life in accordance with their own values could be
interpreted as incompatible with respect for autonomy and an infringement of the
‘‘freedom of each person to order her life and constitute her self in her own way’’
(Noggle 1997, 509).
This interpretation, however, should be resisted. Although respect for autonomy
normally requires a broad range of choices, it is not the same as merely providing
negative space in which people can act (Taylor 2009, 21). Autonomy requires more
than that. If autonomy and negative liberty could be equated, paradigmatically non-
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autonomous agents (e.g., wantons)3 could be deemed to be autonomous, as nothing
precludes them from possessing negative liberty.
Not being able to equate negative liberty and autonomy, it is no longer obvious
that raising the threshold of competence in light of the individual’s values is
incompatible with respect for autonomy. In as far as autonomy includes something
more than mere negative liberty, it is not unreasonable to suppose that protecting an
individual’s ability to live one’s life in accordance with their own values could
require not allowing people to act against their expressed values without
demonstrating the exercise of the capacities to (i) acquire knowledge, (ii) reason
instrumentally, and (iii) form and revise a life plan to the extent necessary to meet a
high threshold. This is due to the fact that, ‘‘given a person’s particular motivational
set’’, an individual may be better able to exercise their autonomy were they ‘‘to have
a set of options available to her that had a smaller number of elements than some
alternative-sets’’ (Taylor 2009, 94). A risk sensitive threshold of competence,
insofar as it uses the individuals own values, is compatible with respect for
autonomy even if it does, in cases like Magician, preclude certain individuals from
pursuing courses of action which run counter to their expressed values. This is due
to the fact that the reason why the threshold of competence is raised is particular to
each individual and, hence, is a response to their ability to live their lives in
accordance with their own values.
In the section entitled ‘‘Knowledge, Rationality and a Life Plan’’, I argued that
competence is demonstrated by meeting a threshold of the three capacities: (i) the
capacity to acquire factual knowledge, (ii) the capacity for instrumental rationality,
and (iii) the capacity to form and revise a life plan. In ‘‘Risk and Thresholds’’, I
argued that protecting an individual’s ability to live their own lives in accordance
with their own values required the use of a subjective criterion of risk, where the
riskiness of the decision is determined by the extent to which the proposed course of
action interacts negatively with the individual’s own values. With a sketch of the
account in hand, I turned to discussing two cases and argued that, even when the
risk-sensitive account of competence raises the threshold an individual has to meet
in such a way as to preclude them from carrying out a particular action, this is in line
with what is required by respect for autonomy as respect for autonomy is compatible
with limiting the option sets of particular people.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued for a risk-sensitive account of competence as a
substitute for ‘‘autonomy’’ in clinical ethics. This account of competence has been
shown to protect people’s ability to live their own lives in accordance with their
own values by grounding Complete Rights to Non-Interference
3 A ‘‘wanton’’ is a type of being which, although it has first order desires (e.g., ‘‘I want a cake’’), does not
possess any second order desires (i.e., desires about desires) about which of its first order desires should
be its will. A wanton, when confronted with two first order desires which conflict (such as ‘‘I want
cake’’ and ‘‘I don’t want to put on weight’’) has no desires about which of these two desires should
become its will.
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(RCI ? RTBI ? RPBI). As the protection of people’s ability to live their own lives
is the primary role of autonomy in a liberal bioethics, the account of competence
argued for here is capable of doing the work currently attributed to autonomy (i.e.,
distributing decisional authority to particular people over particular choices as a
means of protecting their ability to live their lives in accordance with their own
values).
Moreover, in light of the fact that different conceptions of autonomy attribute the
property to different sets of people in ways that conflict with our (pre-theoretical)
beliefs about who should be entitled to make their own decisions regarding their
own health care; using an account of competence to draw the limits of permissible
paternalism allows us to do so without being influenced by the wider theoretical
debates accounts of autonomy are developed in response to. Substituting autonomy
for competence allows us to focus more closely on the question of who should be
entitled to make their own healthcare choices, without being influenced by
discussions about how coherent, integrated or authentic an individual’s preferences
are; all of which are orthogonal to the issue of who should be given decisional
authority.
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